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We Need New Scientific Languages to Harness the Complexity 
of Cognitive Development
To study the behavioral and cognitive struc-
tures that form in the childhood of animals, 
cognitive science has for a long time orga-
nized theories by trying to identify what is 
innate and what is learned, and how nature 
and nurture interact to influence each other. 
However, recent advances in developmental 
sciences are strongly questioning the rel-
evance of this scientific framing based on 
the nature/nurture divide, including argu-
ments that rely on their interaction, as they 
are putting the focus on states and causal 
explanations while key dimensions of devel-
opment are processes of change and pattern 
formation. However, as John Spencer, Mark 
Blumberg and David Shenk argue in the dia-
logue featured in this newsletter, the nativist/
empiricist perspective, and its associated con-
cepts, are still playing a central role both in 
cognitive science and in the way it is explained 
and understood by the larger public. 
Responding to this dialog, several key 
researchers from cognitive and developmen-
tal sciences, as well as biology, propose their 
responses and views: Bob McMurray, Scott 
Robinson, Patrick Bateson, Eva Jablonka, 
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Bart 
de Boer, Gert Westermann, Peter Marshall, 
Vladimir Sloutsky, Dan Dediu, Jedediah 
Allen and Mark Bickhard, Rick Dale, Anne 
Warlaumont and Michael Spivey. They show 
a very stimulating diversity of opinions, 
ranging from defending the utility of keeping 
the nature/nurture framing to arguing that 
biology has already shown its fundamen-
tal weaknesses for several decades. This 
includes several thoughtful analyzes of why 
the nativist/empiricist debate is persisting, 
and what challenges need to be addressed to 
go beyond the limits of this framing. In this 
line, the dialog highlights several socio-epis-
temic factors that make the nature/nurture 
view so robust, and in particular the fact that 
several forms of utility of this view may coun-
terbalance its lack of veracity: it facilitates the 
work of scientists, as it affords experiments 
where single dependent variables are stud-
ied, which are easier and faster to run, explain 
and publish; it facilitates communication to 
the larger public as it  relies on a stable set 
of words and concepts that have been pop-
ularized by talented scientific writers for 
decades; it has been used in many studies 
of human-specific abilities such as language 
and maths skills that have stimulated wonder 
about infant capabilities in both scientists and 
the general public. 
While the dynamical systems approach to 
development has been thriving with many 
impressive studies showing the importance 
of multi-factorial multi-scale processes of 
pattern formation, it has been struggling with 
several challenges to broaden its impact: 
explanations are often more complicated as 
they highlight the complexity of development; 
experimental paradigms to study dynamical 
processes have mostly focused on the devel-
opment of sensorimotor capacities that are 
common with other animals, rather than on 
higher-level human cognition; there is a lack 
of a strong shared vocabulary and ontology 
for speaking about self-organization, pattern 
formation and dynamical systems in cognitive 
development. However, as several authors 
argue, the scientific landscape is progres-
sively evolving toward a « synthesis on the 
horizon ». One of the reasons is that decades 
of work in biological epigenetics is now prop-
agating dynamical systems ideas across the 
sciences and toward the general public, and 
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producing accessible explanations that trig-
ger the sense of wonder about the origins of 
behavior. 
Another reason for the development of 
dynamical systems ideas is the progres-
sive adoption of computational modeling: 
algorithms are becoming a new scientific 
language to precisely and concretely speak 
about and express theories of developmental 
and cognitive processes. This language allows 
us to go beyond the limitations of nature/
nurture/self-organization debates where dif-
ferent authors have used the same words to 
mean different things. An ongoing important 
evolution in the scientific community is that 
computational models are becoming more 
open and interdisciplinary. Using modern tools 
such as Jupyter notebooks that mix scientific 
text, equations and interactive experimenta-
tion of models within the web browser (Shen, 
2014), these models are becoming more 
easily reproducible and cumulatively reused 
across laboratories, including by researchers 
who are not themselves proficient in com-
puter science.
In a new dialog initiation, Olivia Guest and 
Nicolas Rougier explore questions and 
challenges related to openly sharing com-
putational models: What is computational 
reproducibility? How shall codebases be dis-
tributed and included as a central element 
of mainstream publication venues? How to 
ensure computational models are well spec-
ified, reusable and understandable? Those 
of you interested in reacting to this dialog 
initiation are welcome to submit a response 
by November 10th, 2016. The length of each 
response must be between 600 and 800 
words including references (contact pierre-
yves.oudeyer@inria.fr).
CDS TC Community News
The IEEE ICDL-Epirob conference will hap-
pen this year in Cergy-Pontoise/Paris, on the 
19th-22th of September. The general chairs 
are Philippe Gaussier and Minoru Asada, and 
the program chairs are Verena Hafner and 
Alexandre Pitti. The conference will feature 
invited talks by Karl Friston, Julie Grezes and 
Tamim Asfour. I would like to bring special 
attention to the Babybot Challenge organized 
for the second time at the conference, and 
implementing a competition of computational 
models addressing selected infant studies 
findings.
Editorial
Links
Previous open-access editions of the newsletter can be found at: http://icdl-epirob.org/cdsnl 
Web site of the IEEE TC on Cognitive and Developmental Systems: http://icdl-epirob.org/cdstc 
IEEE ICDL-Epirob conference: http://www.icdl-epirob.org
Helen, Shen (2014). “Interactive notebooks: Sharing the 
code”. Nature 515 (7525): 151–152. doi:10.1038/515151a
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In his classic essay, “Seven Wonders,” the 
physician and essayist Lewis Thomas wrote 
that childhood was one of life’s great mys-
teries. For Thomas, childhood led to a sense 
of wonder, not because it is a magical time, 
but because it might have been avoided. Why, 
he pondered, didn’t evolution allow us to skip 
childhood altogether, “to jump catlike from our 
juvenile to our adult [and] productive stage 
of life?” It is indeed extraordinary how long 
it takes for humans to develop into capable 
adults. 
How does this individual development work? 
The question of how a tiny clump of cells 
slowly becomes a person with a particular 
physique, intellect, personality, and emotional 
reservoir has long challenged scientists, let 
alone the general public. For centuries, this 
question has been phrased in terms of nature 
vs. nurture—trying to determine what portion 
of development is dictated by inborn, innate 
forces such as our genes versus what portion 
is shaped by experience.  In recent decades, 
evidence has updated our understanding of 
genes and their relationship to the individual; 
further research on fetal development, neu-
roplasticity, the functional organization of the 
brain, the nature of intelligence, and studies 
of expertise have all come together to suggest 
that the old debates about nature and nurture 
should be thrown out, in favor of something 
new—a unified “developmental systems” 
perspective. 
The new understanding starts with a new con-
ception of the gene. Out of Gregor Mendel’s 
19th-century pea-plant experiments came 
a century-long popular and scientific belief 
that genes were effectively blueprints with 
elaborate predesigned instructions for all 
traits—eye color, thumb size, mathematical 
aptitude, musical sensitivity, and so on. But 
with increasing knowledge about the actual 
mechanics of development, the orthodox 
Mendelian view has been thoroughly upgraded 
into a more sophisticated understanding of 
how traits actually emerge. Genes are not like 
robot actors who always say the same lines in 
the exact same way. Instead, they interact with 
their surroundings from moment to moment 
in complex and interesting ways. 
The developmental systems view also builds 
on recent advances in behavioral neurosci-
ence. Researchers historically viewed the 
brain as a modular system, hardwired for 
specialized abilities. But recent data have 
revealed tremendous plasticity, particularly 
early in development. At one extreme, infant 
plasticity can enable complex cognitive 
functioning even in infants with atypically 
developing brains or after substantial brain 
damage. Simply put, then, none of us is hard-
wired, programmed, or preordained. Each of 
us develops.
Although a wealth of scientific data are con-
sistent with the developmental systems 
perspective, the nature-nurture debate con-
tinues to be the predominant framework for 
talking about development. This is the case 
within scientific disciplines where words 
like ‘innate’ and ‘inborn’ are still commonly 
used (see, e.g., Root, Denny, Hen & Axel, 2014. 
Nature, 515, 269-273); it is also the case 
beyond academia where journalists, practi-
tioners, policy makers, teachers, and parents 
continue to think about a person’s traits as a 
direct result of genes (“Infidelity lurks in your 
genes”, New York Times, May 22, 2015). 
In our view, the scientific evidence for a new 
view of development is overwhelming. Why, 
then, does the centuries-old framing persist? 
Is this a question of a lack of convincing sci-
entific evidence? That is, given more time and 
accumulating knowledge, more and more 
people will come to accept and espouse a 
developmental systems perspective? Or is this 
fundamentally a question of communication? 
That is, is it the case that the nature-nurture 
framework is easier to describe, easier to 
sell? Perhaps the communication advan-
tage of the nativist perspective underlies its 
impressive resilience.
This dialog raises timely questions for us. 
In an effort to improve communication of 
the developmental systems perspective, we 
have undertaken an ambitious project to be 
published in the spring of 2016 as part of 
Wiley’s WIREs series. Our goal was to cre-
ate an on-line collection that presents the 
developmental systems perspective to a 
broad audience in an accessible and scien-
tifically rigorous way. The collection offers 
an overview of the developmental systems 
perspective, spanning molecular and cul-
tural levels, from nanoseconds to millennia, 
addressing both development and evolution. 
The themes explored should be of interest 
to students as well as parents, teachers, and 
policy makers who wish to understand and 
foster the development of individual children. 
Wiley has generously agreed to make the col-
lection free for the first year and, wherever 
possible, the contributors to the collection 
Moving Beyond Nature-Nurture: a Problem of Science or 
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have strived to present their complex mate-
rial using straightforward language. This 
collection represents one perspective on 
how to move beyond the false nature-nurture 
dichotomy. We look forward to hearing other 
perspectives—what do you think?
New Dialogue
Veracity vs. Value: Can Developmental Systems Thinking 
Address Core Human Abilities?  
Why do scientific ideas take hold and per-
sist? Is it because they are more accurate 
descriptions of reality, or because of their 
larger value?  The cognitive revolution (Hebb, 
1960) suggests value.  Even as positivist phi-
losophy was discarded, behaviorist theories 
(e.g., Hebb, 1949; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) 
were never really proven “wrong” and still 
have productive lives today.  The revolu-
tion occurred because the broader package 
offered by behaviorism didn’t have value 
for solving the problems of the day—action 
guidance, signal detection, human factors, 
artificial intelligence and language. 
If this debate between nature/nurture and 
developmental systems were based on verac-
ity, it would have been resolved a decade ago 
(as Spencer, Blumberg & Shenk [this issue] 
and Spencer et al. [2009] capably argue).  It’s 
clearly not.  The question is thus: what is the 
enduring value of nature/nurture?  What prob-
lems does it help solve?
Spencer et al., make a deceptively simple 
observation: It is extraordinary how long  it 
takes for humans to develop into capable 
adults.  I agree.  And yet, if I had to identify 
one conclusion from the last three decades of 
developmental science, it is this: infants are 
very very smart.
This is an odd conclusion. It conflicts with the 
foundational thinkers of development: Piaget, 
Vygotsky, Thelen, and Bates. Yet this zeitgeist 
has overwhelmed the scientific literature 
and the popular consciousness. Journals 
like Infancy have grown in submissions and 
impact.  And when did you last read a study 
of school-age children in Nature or Science? 
We’re at the point where my students (and 
my colleagues report similarly) are so used 
to referring to participants in developmental 
studies as infants, that while discussing the 
occasional study of school age children, they 
slip and call 7 year olds infants!  The study 
of development is now largely the study of 
infants.  
How did this happen?  Thirty-some years 
ago, habituation/looking methods developed 
for perception and learning were adapted 
to high-level cognition, demonstrating that 
infants “know” about solid objects, quan-
tity, cause and effect, and so forth.  To many 
(including me) this invoked a sense of wonder. 
These adorable lumps of humanity—who can’t 
feed themselves, speak or control their bod-
ies—were abstract thinkers!  This body of 
work spoke to the fundamental abilities that 
appear to make us distinct from animals: lan-
guage, reasoning, and social interaction. This 
is what makes us human… and we can see it 
in infancy.  This sense of wonder motivates 
new and old scientists, funding bodies, and 
popular interest.  
This is aided and abetted by assuming continu-
ity between infancy and adulthood (see Haith, 
1998, for a critique).  An ability that would 
be described as language or math or social 
inference in a 5-year-old using sophisticated 
measures is still assumed to be that when 
we detect something vaguely analogous with 
looking time in infancy. Auditory discrimina-
tion becomes language; visual contingencies 
become cause and effect.  Once you go down 
this road it’s hard to see how something so 
complex comes from nothing, particularly 
when infants can’t use language, and don’t 
receive explicit instruction. Researchers who 
want to maintain a focus on infancy along with 
such rich interpretation of infant measures 
may be boxed into a nature/nurture assump-
tion (where a narrower interpretation and a 
lifespan approach might create opportunities 
for systems thinking).  
Of course, applied fields like education, speech 
pathology and clinical psychology have not 
been boxed in in the same way.  These fields 
are motivated by real problems.  Here, studies 
of older children are the norm. They invariably 
show that development comes from complex 
changes in the home and school environ-
ments, interactions among cognitive systems, 
and biology: a developmental system.  These 
developments can’t be distilled to a simple 
learning mechanism or a pre-existing abil-
ity. Yet for basic researchers, it’s just more 
amazing— for themselves, their colleagues, 
and the general public—to discover that a 6 
month old “knows” something about quantity 
than to watch a 3rd grader struggle with math. 
So what’s missing? To be fully embraced, 
developmental systems thinking needs 
more than veracity. It needs wonder.  But 
more importantly, we need developmental 
systems work on fundamental human abili-
ties.  Developmental systems derived from 
animal models of human capacities, with an 
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Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? 
Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and 
Development, 21(2), 167-179. 
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior. Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Hebb, D. O. (1960). The American Revolution. American 
Psychologist, 15, 735-745. 
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of 
Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness of 
reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In A. H. Black & W. 
F. Prokasy (Eds.), Classical Conditioning II (pp. 64-99). New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Spencer, J., Blumberg, M., McMurray, B., Robinson, S. R., 
Samuelson, L., & Tomblin, J. B. (2009). Short arms and 
talking eggs: Why we should no longer abide the nativ-
ist-empiricist debate. Child Development Perspectives, 
3(2), 79-87. 
emphasis on what we may share with ani-
mals. However, nature/nurture inspired work 
has focused on capacities that are unique.  We 
need developmental systems work on human 
topics like cooperation, language, reasoning, 
and mathematical cognition to bridge this 
divide, even though this may be difficult as 
the kinds of animal manipulations that prompt 
systems thinking are simply not possible with 
humans.  We also need work showing what 
infants can’t do, opening the door to lifespan 
development.  This will force us to consider 
the nested systems that drive change in basic 
abilities throughout childhood and adoles-
cence rather than a privileged starting state. 
And we may need more applied development. 
When scientists confront variation in out-
comes and must participate in developmental 
change, rather than just theorize about it, they 
may be forced to embrace complexity.
Spencer et al. ask if the disconnect between 
the evidence for systems and the perva-
siveness of nature/nurture derives from 
insufficient science, or from ease of commu-
nication? There is indeed a lack of work.  But 
it is not a lack of work “proving” the veracity of 
systems.  Rather, it is a lack of work showing 
its value. This sense of wonder—sometimes 
the overbearingly singular value of devel-
opmental science—leads to real rhetorical 
pressure and professional rewards for main-
taining nature/nurture.  But it also frames the 
kinds of questions we ask and the age-groups 
we study in ways that perpetuate nature/
nurture.  There is no single cause of this dis-
connect. It’s a developmental system.  Oh… is 
that an unsatisfying answer to the question?
About the time that I received the invitation 
to contribute to this dialog, I was watching 
a newborn giraffe, the stalk of her umbilical 
still dangling from her belly, slowly following 
behind her mother as she stripped leaves from 
nearby acacia and leadwood trees. Can there 
be a more familiar, or more potent, example of 
the developmental power of Nature than the 
image of a newborn animal — lamb, calf, foal, 
wildebeest — struggling to its feet and walk-
ing within hours, or even minutes, of its birth?
As an ethologist by training, I am constantly 
reminded of the reality of species-typical 
behavior. A mallard drake exhibits precisely 
the same courtship display whether I witness 
it in a park pond in Brooklyn, a pastoral lake 
in Wisconsin, or an irrigation ditch in Oregon. 
I am reminded of the tendency of develop-
ment toward canalization, as pointed out by 
Waddington and illustrated in his familiar 
developmental landscape. Developmental 
processes are noisy and multifactored, but 
they often converge, like hillside streams 
merging into a river, toward predictable end-
points. The mere existence of predictable, 
species-typical outcomes seems to demand 
a guiding principle, where the outcomes are 
preconfigured and the process managed by 
some overseeing force. 
But we no longer appeal to an external mys-
tical force, an élan vital, that shapes the 
unformed clay of the developing embryo and 
infant. Too often the guiding hand is sought 
within us, the homuncular grail of the prefor-
mationists, in our genes. Genes have become 
the gods of the gaps in developmental sci-
ence, where our failures of imagination are 
filled by ascriptions to Nature. 
I am shopping in an African market and I see 
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a young woman dressed in traditional garb 
walking across the square. I do not know 
her, have not spoken to her, but immediately 
recognize her as a compatriot. She is African-
American, not Zulu, Shangaan or Xhosa, and I 
know this simply from the style of her walk-
ing. In another setting, I know that the steps 
coming down the hallway signal the approach 
of my graduate student, recognizable just by 
the individual distinctiveness of her footfalls. 
Bipedal walking is quintessentially human. 
Walking on two legs is as natural for all human 
adults — with only rare exceptions of quadru-
pedalism resulting from unique combinations 
of abnormal brain development and particu-
lar cultural context (Shapiro, et al., 2014) — as 
swimming is to dolphins or flying to bats. Yet 
the onset of independent walking by toddlers 
can be accelerated or delayed by manipulation 
of experience and cultural practices (Adolph, 
Karasik & Tamis-LeMonda, 2010). Proficiency, 
flexibility, and even styles of walking are not 
predetermined, but rather are shaped by 
immediate circumstance (whether I am wear-
ing flip-flops or showshoes), by accumulated 
experience (have I walked on ice before?), by 
social context (Adolph & Robinson, 2013). 
Relevant experience also accrues before 
birth, even though fetuses do not ‘walk’. 
Developmental neuroscience has long 
recognized the ability of the fetal spinal cord 
to produce patterns of alternating discharge, 
which correspond to the alternation of steps 
during walking. Yet the pattern of interlimb 
coordination expressed by rat fetuses in vivo 
can be modified after as little as 15 min of 
constrained limb movement during sponta-
neous activity, with effects lasting 24 hours or 
longer (Robinson, 2016). These experimental 
effects may occur naturally in utero through 
the elastic resistance of the uterus to simul-
taneous limb extension, which energetically 
favors limb alternation during fetal develop-
ment (Brumley & Robinson, 2010). These and 
many other examples of experiential shaping 
of fetal motor skills argue that even the most 
basic action patterns of the newborn have a 
developmental history before birth.
As I return to think about that newborn giraffe, 
I am struck not just by the mystery of how 
such organized behavior can develop in the 
seeming absence of relevant experience, but 
also by realization that despite a century of 
research on locomotion in animals, no one has 
ever thought to look at how walking actually 
develops in precocial mammals. Ultimately, 
that is the problem with Nativism: because 
our faith in the power of genes encourages 
us not to look.
Adolph, K. E., Karasik, L. B., & Tamis-LeMonda, C. S. 
(2010). Motor skills. In M. H. Bornstein (Ed.), Handbook of 
Cross-Cultural Development Science. Vol. 1. Domains of 
Development across Cultures (pp. 61–88). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum.
Adolph, K.E., & Robinson, S.R. (2013). The road to walk-
ing: What learning to walk tells us about development. 
In Zelazo, P.D. (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Developmental 
Psychology (pp. 403-443). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Brumley, M.R., & Robinson, S.R. (2010). Experience in the 
perinatal development of action systems. In Blumberg, 
M.S., Freeman, J.H., Jr., & Robinson, S.R. (Eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Developmental Behavioral Neuroscience (pp. 
181-209). New York: Oxford University Press.
Robinson, S.R. (2016). Yoke motor learning in the fetal rat: 
A model system for prenatal behavioral development. In 
Reissland, N., & Kisilevsky, B. S. (Eds.), Fetal Development: 
Research on Brain and Behavior, Environmental 
Influences, and Emerging Technologies (pp. 43-66). Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer. 
Shapiro, L.J., Cole, W.G., Young, J.W., Raichlen, D.A., 
Robinson, S.R., & Adolph, K.E. (2014). Human quadrupeds, 
primate quadrupedalism, and Uner Tan Syndrome. PLoS 
One, 9(7), e101758.
Why has the discredited Nature/nurture oppo-
sition persisted in popular accounts of where 
behaviour comes from and even in some 
scientific literature? I suspect that some of the 
persistence is due to folk psychology and folk 
biology. I also suspect that some cultural lag 
has occurred partly because dichotomies are 
easy to remember and understand.
The ‘robustness’ of development—whereby 
the general characteristics of each indi-
vidual develop in much the same way 
irrespective of the environment—is often 
contrasted with ‘plasticity’ or malleability, 
which allows change, particularly during 
early development. These seemingly opposed 
characteristics of organisms are frequently 
forced into a dichotomy that is often used to 
explain natural phenomena: the programme 
for an organism’s development is either 
closed or open; its characteristics are either 
immutable or subject to change; the brain is 
either hard-wired or changeable; behaviour 
is either innate or learnt. These opposing 
ideas that seem so obvious to many people 
are misleading and unhelpful to anybody who 
wishes to understand how the body grows and 
the brain develops. How do we draw people 
away from patterns of thought that are rooted 
in conventional public debates about ‘nature’ 
and ‘nurture’ rather than in empirical biology 
which deals with interacting systems?
I have been spectacularly unsuccessful when 
I have tried to offer explanations in the past 
for systems approaches to development. 
Why Do Misleading Dichotomies Persist?
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Some of my brightest students have reacted 
to my University lectures almost with outrage. 
They would listen with mounting irritation as 
I attempted to get them to understand how 
the various things that combine together give 
rise to behavioural development. Then one or 
other of them might say something like this: “I 
don’t understand all this stuff about systems. 
What gets it started in the first place?” Every 
so often I would get a similar response from 
one of my colleagues who was accustomed 
to the idea that research programmes hunted 
down the crucial factor that produced a qual-
itatively distinct effect. The talk of systems 
sounded to them like so much waffle. “Science 
is about uncovering causes” they would tell 
me in a tone a voice usually reserved for a 
small child.
Changing minds is always difficult but it is 
possible to be optimistic. In recent years the 
mood has started to change. Experimentalists 
are less likely these days to hold all but one 
variable constant and, when a single indepen-
dent variable is found to produce an effect, it 
is not immediately taken to be the cause, nor 
is everything else deemed unimportant. The 
nature of the feed-back in free-running sys-
tems is such that the experimentalist’s sharp 
distinction between independence and depen-
dence evaporates. The dependent variable of 
a moment ago becomes the independent vari-
able of the present.
Maybe these changes in thinking have come 
about because computer literacy has made it 
possible to think about the interplay between 
many different things with comparative ease. 
It is not difficult to construct simple working 
models on our personal computers. When 
the rules of operation are non-linear, the 
behaviour of these models can change in 
complicated ways that are difficult to predict 
when the parameters are altered. Without 
basing them rigorously on what is known 
about behaviour and underlying mecha-
nisms, such models merely serve to teach 
us a simple lesson about causality. But the 
more general point is that the development 
of individuals is readily perceived as an inter-
play between them and their environments. 
The current state influences which genes are 
expressed, and also the social and physical 
world. Individuals are then seen as choosing 
and changing the conditions to which they are 
exposed.
The use of the nature/nurture distinction 
involves a confusion of categories, since ‘nur-
ture’ was seen as a developmental process 
and ‘nature’ was often viewed as the genetic 
origin of that process. Inasmuch as these 
terms are used at all, nature stands for the 
characteristics of an organism and carries 
no implication about how they developed. 
Nurture stands for the processes by which 
the characteristics develop. The conventional 
opposition of these two terms is necessar-
ily false. As this point sinks in, I believe that 
scientists and their popularisers will learn to 
avoid falling into the old conceptual and lin-
guistic traps. 
The persistence of the debate about the 
nature-nurture dichotomy is, for a biologist, 
a bit of a mystery. Hundreds of professional 
and popular books and essays have shown, 
from every perspective possible, that it makes 
no sense to try to explain macroscopic traits 
(what biologists call phenotypic traits) like 
height, intelligence, or temperament just by 
recourse to the individual’s genetic constitu-
tion. This was the whole point of the distinction 
between the genotype (genetic constitution) of 
the individual and their phenotype (the visible 
suite of traits) made by the Danish botanist 
Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909. The phenotype 
is by definition the product of the interaction 
of genes and the developmental environment 
of the organism. We now know that the par-
ticular DNA sequences that we inherited, the 
epigenetic marks and other factors that were 
transmitted to us by our parents, the embry-
onic environment in which we developed, and 
the countless inputs that we have acquired 
from our social and cultural environment 
from birth onwards all contribute to our own 
individual development, to our phenotype. 
Moreover, we now know that some of these 
inputs can also be important for inheritance 
and evolution. So what is the problem? Why 
does the dichotomy persist?
There are, it seems, many reasons. These 
include cultural stereotypes regarding the 
fixity of racial, national and gender traits; a 
romantic fascination with the mysterious 
guiding force of ancestral genes; a search for 
simple scientific answers that, like Newton’s 
laws, can explain much complexity in one 
grand sweep. All these conspire to render the 
nature-nurture dichotomy a very strong “cul-
tural attractor”. But I think that the problem is 
also one of communication, which feeds into 
this attractor. When geneticists explain the 
relationship between genes and phenotypes 
to laypersons, they stress three somewhat 
different aspects of the relationship, which 
are often confounded and presented in overly 
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simplistic (and misleading) ways: 
1. The phenotype is the product of the interac-
tion of genotype and environment. Although 
this fundamental point is universally accepted 
by all biologists, when heredity is explained to 
laypersons, the focus is on the persistence of 
inherited traits, so environmental effects tend 
to be ignored and are seen as an icing on a 
genetically determined cake.
 
2. A genetic variation in a single gene does 
not necessarily make a difference to the 
phenotype. The interactions between genes 
and environment are very complex, so there 
is usually no one-to-one correspondence 
between genetic and phenotypic variation. 
For example, only about 2% of the human dis-
eases that have a hereditary component can 
be explained by a difference in a single gene. 
The other 98% depends on several variant 
genes and the developmental environment 
in which they are expressed. Nevertheless, in 
order to explain Mendelian laws and the basic 
facts of genetic segregation, only the simple 
2% of cases are given as examples. Similarly, 
while marveling at the similarities of identi-
cal twins, their many discordances tend to be 
ignored.
3. Environmentally-induced developmental 
variations can be inherited. While accepting 
that the individual’s development is affected 
by the environment, for many decades it 
was assumed that all traces of the parents’ 
developmental history are erased between 
generations, so what is “hard”, enduring, and 
truly important is the genetic legacy. Although 
the inheritance of developmentally-induced 
variation was repeatedly reported through-
out the 20th century, these observations were 
ignored. However, in the last 30 years, some 
of the molecular mechanisms underlying the 
inheritance of developmentally-induced dis-
positions (epigenetic inheritance) have been 
unraveled, and the topic is today a subject 
of intense research. With a few notable and 
vocal exceptions, most biologists accept that 
the new discoveries extend the concept of 
heredity and are excited about its medical, 
developmental, and evolutionary implications. 
But the way epigenetics is explained to lay-
persons is often simplistic, leading to claims 
that “genes are changed by the environment”. 
This make it sound as if the nature-nurture 
dichotomy has been resolved, but the solu-
tion comes at the high price of confusing gene 
expression (which can be thus changed) with 
DNA sequence variation (which usually cannot), 
thus undermining the basic understanding 
of genetics. Such misapprehensions hinder 
rather than promote the dissolution of the 
dichotomy.
As I see it, accepting that one needs to think 
in terms of interactions between different 
inputs to development and heredity was never 
a problem for honest geneticists. (I exclude 
those that served totalitarian regimes, such as 
the Nazis and Stalinists, and those who have 
cynically used the problem to gain publicity). I 
also believe that the subject can be explained 
to laypersons if biologists use language care-
fully, distinguish between different facets of 
the dichotomy, give appropriate examples, 
and avoid patronizing simplifications. Good 
communication is certainly necessary for the 
dissolution of the problem, and I think that it 
should eventually transform the still dominant 
dichotomy-discourse into the rich, integrated 
view now shared by almost all biologists. 
All theorists who study cognitive develop-
ment agree that development in an individual 
involves complex multilevel processes and 
that psychological traits cannot be explained 
solely in terms of genetic or environmen-
tal variables. The fascinating research that 
Spencer et al. touch on—recent work on 
genes, fetal development, neuroplasticity, 
etc.—is making important contributions to 
our understanding of the mind. But none of 
this research shows that nativist theories of 
development are misguided or that the nativ-
ism-empiricism debate is obsolete.
Interactionism is the view that no trait’s 
development is solely the product of genetic 
factors or solely the product of environmen-
tal factors. Rather, genetic factors always 
interact with various types of environmental 
factors. Moreover, given the nature of this 
interaction and the way that traits develop, 
it makes no sense to say that genetic factors 
are responsible for X% of a trait and environ-
mental factors for Y%. There is widespread, if 
not universal, consensus regarding the truth 
of interactionism in the scientific community. 
We wholeheartedly agree with this consensus. 
At the same time, we are advocates of nativist 
theories of development, and take the nativ-
ism-empiricism debate to be of fundamental 
importance.
What is the focal point of the nativism-empir-
icism debate? Nativists and empiricists agree 
that most psychological traits are acquired 
via psychological processes and so depend 
Nativism, Empiricism, and the Interactionist Consensus
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Language is an example of a human behavior 
in which nature and nurture—and of course 
development—all play a role. Clearly, there is 
something special about humans that allows 
us to use language, while all other animals 
cannot. This indicates that there is something 
in our biological makeup—nature—that allows 
us to use language. At the same time, there 
are many different languages and dialects, 
illustrating that learning—nurture—is crucial, 
too. Language illustrates the points made by 
the initiators of the dialog: although much has 
been made of the human-specific mutation in 
the FOXP2 “language” gene, the geneticists 
who have actually looked at it agree that it is 
a very broad regulatory gene that only very 
indirectly influences certain aspects of speech 
and language (see Dediu, 2015 for an over-
view of the genetics of language). Language 
also illustrates the point about flexibility: 
although there is good evidence that language 
tends to recruit the same areas in the brains 
of normally developed people—left temporal 
cortex—(see Fedorenko & Thompson-Schill, 
2014 for a recent review) there is equally 
good evidence that children with damage to 
that part of their brains learn language to a 
level that is nearly indistinguishably from 
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upon prior psychological traits. Learning a 
new route home, or a new name, or how to 
tie a new type of knot (etc.) all depend upon 
psychological resources that must already be 
in place for the acquisition to occur. But not 
every psychological trait can be explained in 
this way; not all learning mechanisms can 
themselves be learned. It is at this point that 
nativists and empiricists part ways. They 
disagree about the fundamental psychologi-
cal structures—the unlearned psychological 
primitives—that ultimately account for all psy-
chologically-mediated development (Margolis 
& Laurence 2013). 
 
Empiricists take this collection of psycholog-
ical primitives to consist in a relatively small 
number of psychological states and mecha-
nisms. Empiricists also suppose that the very 
same psychological systems underlie dispa-
rate types of acquired psychological traits. 
Because these systems aren’t geared towards 
acquisition in specific cognitive domains, 
they may be said to be domain-general. 
Nativists, by contrast, posit a richer collec-
tion of psychological primitives. In addition 
to domain-general psychological systems, 
nativists posit a large number of more spe-
cialized psychological systems that are not 
themselves acquired on the basis of more 
fundamental psychological systems. Nativists 
also tend to posit the existence of a significant 
number of psychologically primitive concepts 
or representations.
Psychological primitives aren’t learned—they 
are the psychological structures that make 
learning possible—but that doesn’t mean 
they are sui generis. Rather, they are acquired 
through other sorts of processes, including 
the complex and varied types of gene-envi-
ronment interactions that Spencer et al. take 
to be the hallmark of the developmental sys-
tems approach. In this way, both nativist and 
empiricist theories are perfectly compatible 
with the truth of interactionism.
Many critics of the nativism-empiricism 
debate are particularly critical of nativism. 
When such criticisms are directed against 
specific nativist proposals, experiments, 
or arguments, they are very welcome and 
can make important contributions to the 
nativism-empiricism debate. However, it is 
a mistake to dismiss innate ideas and mod-
ules (understood as psychologically primitive 
structures) on the grounds that they are 
incompatible with interactionism. And there 
exists much evidence in favor of nativist the-
ories in a wide variety of domains, including 
object cognition (Baillargeon et al. 2011), spa-
tial, temporal, and numerical cognition (de 
Hevia et al. 2014), natural language (Laurence 
& Margolis 2001), and moral cognition (Hamlin 
2015), among others.
Everyone is an interactionist. But interac-
tionism gives no grounds for abandoning the 
nativism-empiricism debate. This leaves the 
question whether the character of the inter-
actions involved in development support 
nativist or empiricist theories of development 
in particular cases. And with respect to this 
question, nativism is very much still in the 
running.
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normal children (see Anderson, Spencer-
Smith, & Wood, 2011 for a review of child 
brain plasticity). This would seem to indicate 
that the developmental perspective is the one 
to take when studying language, and although 
this is undoubtedly true for many questions, I 
would argue that studying language from the 
perspective of nature or nurture may still be 
interesting in many cases. 
Both nature and nurture can be studied 
independently to some degree in language. 
If one is interested in historical linguistics, 
language change, descriptive linguistics, 
linguistic diversity and many sociolinguistic 
phenomena, one mainly looks at the socially 
transmitted, learned component of language: 
the nurture side of things. If, on the other hand, 
one is interested in the biological evolution of 
the ability to use language (my own field of 
expertise) one wants to learn about the nature 
side of things. This does not mean that one 
can study both these aspects entirely inde-
pendently. When studying language change 
for instance, one can stop at describing how 
a linguistic variant changes over time, but 
if one wants to understand why the change 
happened the way it did, we need to under-
stand cognitive mechanisms and articulatory 
constraints. Both of these are determined by 
our biological make-up. Similarly, if we want 
to understand which aspects of our vocal tract 
have evolved to deal with language, we need 
to come to terms with the fact that language is 
not just shaped by biological processes, but is 
also the result of development and (cultural) 
language change.  Nevertheless, the ultimate 
questions that we are interested in may be 
concerned mostly with nature or mostly with 
nurture, and for simplification’s sake ignore 
development.
 
That we investigate questions that deal with 
nature or nurture is therefore not problem-
atic. The issue becomes problematic when we 
present it as a false dichotomy: is it nature 
or nurture? Not only is this question mean-
ingless because most phenomena are due 
to nature and nurture (and a healthy dose of 
development) it is also meaningless because 
one’s answer depends on one’s definition of 
nature and nurture. In this respect the ques-
tion is similar to one that fuels debate in 
linguistics: is language due to language-spe-
cific cognition or to general cognition? 
Because one researcher’s language-specific 
cognition is another researcher’s general cog-
nition, this leads to fruitless disagreement. We 
need to focus on questions that are empiri-
cally answerable. In the linguistic debate a 
possible question would be: what aspects of 
cognition have undergone selective pressure 
related to speech and language? It should 
be noted that while this is a question about 
“nature”, it cannot be answered without paying 
attention to nurture and development. This is 
because there is no simple mapping between 
language universals and the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying them (Thompson, Kirby, & 
Smith, 2016). In order to answer the question, 
linguists need to tease apart the effects of 
cognitive processes, biological developmen-
tal processes, processes related to language 
learning and cultural processes related to lan-
guage change. 
I would therefore argue that the authors are 
right that development plays an important 
role, but I would also argue that nature and 
nurture are still useful concepts to formu-
late scientific hypothesis and their answers. 
Still, I agree that the media tend to oversim-
plify scientific findings and therefore create 
the impression that there may still be more 
debate about nature versus nurture than there 
really is in the scientific literature. Although 
we cannot control what the media do with our 
scientific results (and this is not necessarily 
a bad thing) it is good that the authors have 
taken the trouble to set up a resource that 
interested non-specialists can consult for a 
more nuanced view of these matters.
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Spencer, Blumberg and Shenk mention the 
communication advantage of the nativist view, 
and this clearly must play a major role in why 
the field is so slow in progressing to a more 
balanced view (Newcombe, 2011, went so far 
as to claim that nativism is the currently dom-
inant theory in developmental psychology). 
Development as an outcome of interactions 
between genes and environment (and between 
different aspects of the developing child 
such as motor development, the social envi-
ronment, interactions between brain areas, 
between neurons) is messy. In order to avoid 
underspecification (‘everything is somehow 
Nativism As an Outcome of How Developmental Science Is Done
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linked to everything else’) it is necessary to 
provide a coherent theory of how development 
proceeds on a trajectory that is constrained by 
these and other factors. We have formulated 
the theory of Neuroconstructivism to begin 
such an endeavor (Mareschal et al., 2007; 
Westermann et al., 2007; see also Johnson, 
2011). While some aspects of a new, inter-
active view of development have captured 
people’s imagination in the same way that 
many nativist explanations have (e.g., expe-
rience shapes the brain; experience shapes 
genes), the field is still some way off from a 
coherent theory that matches the perceived 
simplicity of nativism and the attraction to the 
media of showing how smart young babies 
are. The WIRES special issue is a useful step 
toward this aim. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the communica-
tive advantage of nativism is only one part 
that contributes to the stubborn survival of the 
nature-nurture question, and the more ‘pure’ 
forms of nativism. Part of this state of the field 
lies in a combination of publication bias and 
the nature of developmental research. 
What are the questions we try to answer in 
developmental research? More often than not 
it is the age by which infants show a certain 
ability, while de-emphasizing the question of 
developmental change. Asking this question 
in my view predisposes the field towards 
an overall nativist view of development. If 
enough labs test for the early presence of a 
certain ability it is highly likely that eventu-
ally a positive result will be found, and it is 
possible that this is a false positive, specifi-
cally if sample sizes are low and effect sizes 
are small (see the recent pre-conference at 
ICIS2016 on Building Best Practice in infancy 
Research for discussions of these points, 
http://bestpracticesinfancy.weebly.com). 
Without pre-registration, and without the 
option to publish negative results, a single 
positive result showing early complex abili-
ties is published while the many unsuccessful 
attempts never see the light of day. Due to 
the attractiveness of such results both to the 
media and to textbook authors they gain wide 
traction and can eventually be accepted as 
uncontroversial.
One such project in which I have been involved 
concerns the ability of infants to detect 
sound-symbolic word-object congruencies 
(preferring ‘bouba’ as a label for a rounded 
object and ‘kiki’ as a label for a jagged object). 
Following publication of a paper showing that 
this ability is present in 2.5-year-olds (Maurer 
et al., 2006), colleagues from three or four 
different labs and my own lab investigated if 
the same ability already exists in prelinguis-
tic infants less than one year of age. We did 
not find that young infants showed sensitiv-
ity to this relationship. Nevertheless, positive 
results soon began to be published in the lit-
erature (Ozturk et al., 2013). The consequence 
of these published findings (be they true or 
false positives) is that they constrain theo-
retical explanations of sound symbolism and 
favor theorizing that it is innate and forms 
the basis of language learning instead being 
an outcome of early language (Ozturk et al., 
2013). Moreover, in the light of such published 
findings it becomes very hard to argue for the-
ories that rely on a gradual development of 
this ability, because a reviewer will inevitably 
point out that it has already been shown that 
this ability is present in very young infants. 
I should stress that I am not implying that 
there is anything untoward in these kinds of 
results. An individual study cannot establish 
whether a result is a true or false positive. My 
point is: false positives almost inevitably push 
developmental theory towards nativism. 
Nevertheless, I believe the outlook is pos-
itive. Recent meta-analyses (e.g., one on 
sound-symbolism in infancy, Lammertink 
et al., 2016), large scale longitudinal studies 
(e.g., on imitation in infancy, Oostenbroek et 
al., 2016), review papers that evaluate the-
oretical claims against the evidence used to 
support these claims (e.g., on natural peda-
gogy, Heyes, 2016; on imitation, Ray & Heyes, 
2011), and the methodological considerations 
pertinent to the field of psychology as a whole 
(the Best Practice Workshop held at ICIS 2016) 
are promising and might lead to a rebalancing 
in the field on questions such as whether early 
abilities are present from birth or learned, and 
whether they are domain-specific or arise out 
of general learning principles.
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I agree with Spencer and colleagues that 
the extant scientific evidence clearly sup-
ports a rejection of any simplistic view that 
pits nature against nurture. Most students of 
developmental science (and perhaps many 
laypeople as well) would likely agree with this 
rejection. However, if pressed for elaboration, 
a common response may be something along 
the lines of “it isn’t one or the other, but the 
interaction between the two”. The issue then 
becomes how to communicate what interac-
tion means after a split conception of nature 
and nurture is discarded. This is not straight-
forward, given that the starting point for the 
entire premise of nature and nurture is one of 
splits and divisions, including additive interac-
tions between genes and environment. What 
is needed is a different starting point.
Progress towards a truly integrative devel-
opmental science has been hampered by the 
inherent limitations of what Goldhaber (2012) 
labeled the “classic debate” over nature vs. 
nurture that took shape over the 20th century. 
From the beginning, this debate was charac-
terized by the notion of separable influences 
of genes and environment. Challenges to this 
idea came from various theorists who went 
against the prevailing tide and whose ideas 
shaped what eventually became known as 
developmental systems theory (see Johnston, 
2010). Historically, one target of develop-
mental systems theorists has been kinship 
studies, which purport to find main effects of 
genetic and environmental factors. However, 
for the developmental systems theorist, there 
is no such thing as a main effect of genes or 
environment. The robust nature of the devel-
opmental system may produce what looks 
through the lens of some methods (e.g., 
behavior genetics) to be main effects, but such 
notions are the product of methods derived 
from a metatheoretical worldview of splits 
and divisions. In contrast, from the develop-
mental systems perspective, there are only 
interactions….all the way down.
So how can this notion of interactions all the 
way down be effectively taught and dissem-
inated? I suggest that the process-relational 
developmental systems account (Overton, 
2015) provides a way forward. This account 
is founded in a relational metatheory that 
disavows the splits that have typically char-
acterized mainstream psychology (e.g., nature 
vs. nurture, mind vs. body, biology vs. culture). 
In the context of development, this account 
turns away from simple interactionism to see 
interpenetration or co-action as characteriz-
ing all aspects of the developmental system. 
Central to the process-relational develop-
mental systems account is the notion that 
addressing questions about development 
involves integrating across different types 
of explanation (Marshall, 2014). As such, this 
perspective includes an appeal to an abstract 
explanatory factor that has been termed pat-
tern explanation (Overton, 1991).
The notion of pattern explanation is tied up 
with a particular way of thinking about sys-
tems, and in particular about living systems, 
which create, organize, and maintain them-
selves in a fundamentally different way to 
nonliving things (Merleau-Ponty, 1967). A 
living organism recursively creates, orga-
nizes, and maintains itself, in the sense that 
the organizational (or structural) properties 
of that system emerge from the endoge-
nous activity of the system itself (Maturana 
& Varela, 1980). However, rather than simply 
viewing these structural properties as a caus-
ally inert outcome arising from the activity of 
lower-level processes, allowing for a pattern 
explanation means accepting that the organi-
zation (pattern) of a living system plays more 
than a descriptive role. As such, this approach 
considers not only how higher-order pattern 
emerges from lower-level processes but also 
how the emergent pattern constrains the 
activity of those processes (Witherington & 
Heying, 2015). It is exactly this kind of inter-
penetrating, recursive co-action that needs to 
replace simpler notions of interaction. How 
we effectively communicate such ideas is a 
challenge that requires urgent attention. 
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In their essay, Spencer, Blumberg, and Shenk 
(SBS) raise an important and provocative 
question: Given our new (much fuller and 
more sophisticated) knowledge of genes 
and their manifestation, of embryology, and 
of brain development should we abandon 
an old nature/nurture dichotomy in favor of 
a unified “developmental systems” perspec-
tive? The question has at least three levels: 
the science level (i.e., How does development 
work and what matters for development?), 
the philosophy of science question (i.e., What 
is an adequate level of abstraction: What can 
and cannot be left out?), the science com-
munication level (how to best communicate 
science to the public). Given that there is lit-
tle disagreement between me and SBS with 
respect to what matters and the short format 
of this commentary, I will focus primarily 
on the second question. And here the issue 
raised by SBS becomes rather complex. There 
are at least three reasons for that. First, the 
complex causality is not unique to develop-
mental systems, and often the assignment 
of causes favor simplicity. Second, the “right” 
level of abstraction can be established only 
a posteriori when the framework outlives its 
competitors. And third, there are important 
trade-offs between simplicity and complexity.
Although it is tempting to think that the living 
systems are special with respect to causal-
ity, causality is rarely straightforward even 
in simpler systems. There are always mul-
tiple contributing factors, some of which 
are interpreted as causes (as thus primary), 
whereas others as merely enabling conditions 
(and thus secondary). Why does the pendu-
lum swing the way it does? Is it because of 
the gravity or because it was put in motion? 
Although both are necessary conditions, phys-
ics considers gravity as the primary reason 
(or the cause) because this is considered to be 
the “right” level of abstraction. Which brings 
me to the next reason: the “right” level of 
abstraction (and thus complexity) cannot be 
determined a priori.
Similar to evolution, there is no design in 
science—the process is blind. Therefore, the 
right level of abstraction cannot be designed 
and decided upon, it only can be selected 
against the competitors. Frameworks are not 
selected because they are “right”, but they are 
“right” because they were selected. For exam-
ple, whereas dualism was rejected in favor of 
monism in mechanical or living systems, it 
was embraced in quantum physics in the form 
of particle-wave duality. And it was embraced 
not because it was “right”, but because it won 
against the competitors. Which brings me to 
the third problem: What constitutes “winning” 
in a competition of science ideas?
There is a simple fact that more complex the-
ories (or models) have more variables and 
thus more free parameters. As a result, the 
theory can explain (or fit) more data. At the 
same time, they may not be sufficiently con-
strained to make accurate predictions. Again, 
nothing is in the absolute, but only relative to 
the competitors. Therefore, theories that are 
too complex may explain much but predict 
little; the opposite is true for theories that 
are too simple. The clearest case of the latter 
is a simple empirical generalization of data. 
Perhaps “winning” is being better than the 
competitor on both.
For these reasons, I believe that the history 
has to play itself out. Given that no level of 
complexity/abstraction is right a priori, only 
direct competition may establish what is right. 
Furthermore, what is right today, may become 
wrong tomorrow. And that is the beauty of our 
enterprise!
Completion, Evolution, and Moving beyond Nature-Nurture
Department of Psychology
Ohio State University,
Columbus, USA
Vladimir Sloutsky
I always recommend Mameli & Bateson’s 
(2006) paper (or Carroll’s 2011 book) when 
faced with this false dichotomy or, if time 
lacks, I briefly mention some easy to visualize 
examples (crocodile sex, phenylketonuria, the 
beaver’s dam, or even the genetics of height 
including the secular trend) to make the point 
that you can’t seriously talk about nature ver-
sus nurture. On the other hand, it certainly 
takes me more words and drawing things in 
the air with my hands—and the listener more 
cognitive effort and patience—to follow this 
than to simply conceptualize a broad “innate” 
(or “nature”) versus an even broader “learned” 
(or “nurture”) dichotomy.
Is there enough scientific evidence to explode 
the old nature vs nurture view and over-
whelmingly support a more nuanced and 
complex one? Certainly yes! But that evidence 
is far from complete and for those aspects 
that normal people care about (such as lan-
guage, intelligence or sexual fidelity) most of 
the time we must fill in enormous gaps with 
metaphors and inferences and suggestions.
So, to be brief, when even those scien-
tists at the forefront of understanding the 
A Multi-Layered Problem
Language and Genetics,
Max Planck Institute for 
Psycholinguistics,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Dan Dediu
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evolutionary and developmental aspects 
of language (language is my main interest) 
struggle with partial evidence, when they 
must extrapolate results from animal models 
and cell cultures, when the results of massive 
genome association studies are confusing 
and hard to replicate, when it is unclear what 
one can carry over from pathologies with a 
genetic component to normal language users, 
and when the best examples of gene-culture 
co-evolution and cultural niche construction 
come from lactose tolerance and the immune 
system, we probably shouldn’t be too hard on 
non-specialist scientists or, even more so, the 
public at large. It is fair to say that we don’t 
yet really understand how language came to 
be, how it develops in individuals and how our 
biology interacts with our culture. Of course, 
we can rule out single-gene accounts or sim-
plistic models where the speakers of certain 
language are “genetically adapted” to speak 
those languages, but everything else is work 
in progress.
It is easy to be frustrated that “people don’t 
get it” and that old stereotypes die hard (and 
indeed nature versus nurture is one of those 
that seem to stick around in almost every cor-
ner of popular culture one cares to look into) 
but to have any hope of replacing them we 
need to be realistic and first realize that, if we 
are successful, the process will take so long 
that by the time it is completed we will have 
unavoidably advanced past that stage and 
regard the new stereotype as backwards (yes, 
even DST will evolve into something else!).
But the most important aspect, I think, is repre-
sented by what we want people to understand 
and why. Granted, the nature versus nurture 
view probably has real-world consequences 
in, for example, how educational programs 
are enacted and in how people suffering from 
pathologies with a genetic component are 
treated by the larger society, but it has a mas-
sive advantage for the busy, tired, distracted, 
continuously assaulted by all sorts of per-
suasive nudges and conflicting information 
normal humans of today: it is extremely easy 
to convey, understand and think with (and this 
does hold also for scientists in other disci-
plines and science journalists even if arguably 
part of our job description is to keep abreast 
with all that is new, but can we realistically do 
it?). What can we replace that with? Even heri-
tability percents require a lot of explaining. Do 
we have a simple account for these complex 
and not-yet-fully fleshed out theories? To be 
frank: my perception is that Dawkins was so 
good at popularizing the evolutionary theory 
of the 60s and 70s because he is an amazing 
writer but also because the theory itself was 
mature: can we say the same about today’s 
DST?
Finally, if we agree that we must replace 
nature versus nurture by another (DST-
inspired) metaphor, do we do it the right way? 
Do we target the right audiences with the right 
content and format especially given that what 
is aimed at here is no less than a change to 
deeply entrenched, almost intuitive concep-
tions of reality (weltanschauung)? People are 
complicated and even for things that really, 
really, really matter for them (health, diet, 
exercise) and where information is widely 
available, it is still extremely hard to change 
conceptions and behaviors despite research-
based expensive programs running for many 
years. And scientists too are busy staying 
afloat in a highly competitive world of pub-
lish-and-get-grants-or-perish and time for 
changing one’s assumptions about things not 
perceived as directly relevant is very scarce. 
I’m not skeptical, I am only cautious...
Mameli, M., & Bateson, P. (2006). Innateness and the 
Sciences. Biology and Philosophy, 21, 155–188.
Carroll, S. B. (2011). Endless Forms Most Beautiful: The 
New Science of Evo Devo : and the Making of the Animal 
Kingdom. Quercus Publishing.
Why is the nature-nurture conceptualization 
of developmental phenomena still used? The 
authors emphasize issues concerning com-
munication for both students and the wider 
public. We agree that communication is part 
of the issue but would suggest two other 
reasons.
First, the nature-nurture framing is instru-
mentally useful for researchers to conduct 
experiments. Whether or not developmen-
tal research is focused on issues related to 
nature-nurture directly, it is often “conve-
nient” for methodologies to presuppose that 
framing (e.g., accounting for variability with a 
“nurture” variable or a “nature” variable).
Second, we suggest that the nature-nurture 
framing is especially persistent in areas of 
developmental science that involve the “repre-
sentational mind”—because that framing is 
intrinsic to a fundamental error regarding the 
ontology and origins of representation that is 
ubiquitous in the field. That is, the nature-nur-
ture framework is presupposed in standard 
(false) background assumptions regarding 
cognition and representation.
Emergence, Action, & Representation
Jedediah W. P. Allen
Mark H. Bickhard
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Many researchers believe that the problem 
with the nature-nurture framing only exists 
when the two ends of the frame are construed 
as mutually exclusive (i.e., when claims are 
made that development is caused by either 
nature or nurture but not both). Accordingly, 
the “obvious” resolution within this framing 
of the problem is for nature and nurture to be 
united through interactions such that develop-
ment is caused by both nature and nurture. 
This alternative — the most prevalent in main-
stream developmental psychology — fails to 
recognize that there is a more substantive 
problem.
A stronger claim is that the problem with the 
nature-nurture framing is that the frame is 
misguided or incoherent (Spencer et al., 2009). 
We agree, and suggest that the incoherence 
is a consequence of not having an adequate 
ontology for studying development — in par-
ticular, development as a constructive process 
of ongoing emergence. In accordance with 
this framework, a shift that has taken place in 
parts of developmental science has made use 
of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) as a gen-
eral theoretical framework for understanding 
self-organization and emergence. For DST, 
development is a self-organizing process with 
various parameters that have traditionally 
been labeled as nature or nurture, but these 
parameters do not cause developmental pro-
cesses anymore than oxygen causes fire or 
land causes tornados.
From this perspective, finding variables that 
predict variance in developmental outcomes 
is a starting point for developmental explana-
tion and modeling of ongoing processes — and 
moving beyond that starting point requires an 
adequate ontology for hypothesized models. 
Such an ontology will necessarily consider 
development as a dynamic system that 
involves multiple types and levels of emer-
gence. But still more is needed to provide a 
complete alternative to the nature-nurture 
framing. In other words DST is itself neces-
sary but not sufficient as an alternative to the 
nature-nurture framing.
The use of DST to understand development 
as a self-organizing process has been most 
beneficial in those areas that are not “repre-
sentationally rich”: Part of what is missing 
from this framework is an adequate model 
of representation. When the nature-nurture 
debate is restricted to representational issues 
it can be recast as the nativist-empiricist 
debate. Nativists and empiricists offer con-
trasting answers to the issues of origins in the 
sense of “where does knowledge come from?” 
For the nativist, basic knowledge is innate—it 
“comes from” evolution. For the empiricist, 
basic knowledge “comes from” the environ-
ment. However, just as nature and nurture do 
not cause development, knowledge does not 
“come from” anywhere. Instead, knowledge 
is emergent in the constructive processes of 
embodied systems. For an action perspec-
tive, knowing the world means knowing how 
to successfully interact with it. Piaget offered 
the best known model for how knowledge is 
emergent in action, and his action-based con-
structivism was an attempt to transcend the 
problem of assuming that knowledge comes 
from somewhere.
More contemporary versions of an action-
based approach to knowledge exist with 
concomitant conceptual shifts in understand-
ing the nature of learning and development 
(Bickhard, 2009). We have argued else-
where that knowledge must be emergent in 
(inter)-action to exist at all (Allen & Bickhard, 
2013), and that, through some sort of reflec-
tion process, new forms of knowing can 
develop. Emergence in general may be the key 
to transcending any foundationalist dichotomy 
(nature-nurture, nativist-empiricist, etc.) — 
without emergence, a foundationalism cannot 
account for its assumed foundation. We sug-
gest, however, that an action-based model of 
the emergence of knowledge/representation 
in particular is a necessary further elabora-
tion in developmental psychology.
Dept. of Psychology, 
Bilkent University,
Ankara, Turkey
Jedediah W. P. Allen
Dept. of Philosophy and 
Psychology,
Lehigh University,
Pennsylvania, USA
Mark H. Bickhard
We agree with the authors of the dialog 
initiation: The evidence for a new view of 
development has become overwhelming, in 
cognitive science (e.g., Elman et al., 1996; 
Spencer, Thomas, & McClelland, 2009), and 
well beyond it (Carroll, 2005; Jablonka & 
Lamb, 2014). The old dichotomy of “nature 
vs. nurture” is inconsistent with this more 
complex perspective in which the interac-
tions between genes and environment do 
more work to shape brain and behavior than 
either genes or environment do on their own 
Synthesis on the Horizon: Gene-Environment Interactions and 
Cognition 
Rick Dale
Anne S. Warlaumont
Michael J. Spivey
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(e.g., Fischer & Bidell, 1991; Hong, West and 
Greenberg, 2005).  Those of us who embrace 
this new perspective ask for some big 
changes from our colleagues on both sides 
of the debate. It should motivate the nativist 
developmental psychologist to let go of cer-
tain explanatory oversimplifications. It should 
also inspire learning-oriented researchers to 
consider constraints from within. Despite such 
overwhelming evidence and the enticement 
of scientific progress, we also agree with the 
authors that there is so much work left to do. 
Is this persistence of an overly simple notion of 
“innate” due to a lack of progress in cognitive 
science and developmental psychology? Or is 
it due to a public audience that demands sim-
plicity in how our science is communicated? It 
seems obvious to us that both of these issues 
have played a role. Yet, big changes on both 
these fronts may be imminent.
The traditional nativist proposal implies a 
simplistic causal chain from gene to cortex 
to module, with a putative toolkit lying inside 
our children that might include naïve physics 
and biology, causal reasoning, mathematics, 
social mindreading, and more. Although it is 
easy to find continued proposals for sophisti-
cated cognitive mechanisms somehow baked 
into the genome, this oversimplified version 
of cognitive nativism has been eroding rapidly 
over the past two decades. Studies challeng-
ing the simple causal chain now abound. For 
example, when epigenetic processes alter 
the same string of human DNA, by silencing 
or activating it in development, the resulting 
phenotype can produce normal development 
or epilepsy (Gräff & Mansuy, 2008). When a 
newborn ferret has its optic nerve rewired 
to its auditory cortex, the cells there develop 
visual receptive fields and self-organize into 
patches of similar orientation selectivity (Sur 
& Leamy, 2001). Classic cognitive nativism is 
rapidly losing explanatory cash value, as the 
epigenetic factors underlying cognitive devel-
opment gain appreciation.
This emerging appreciation that develop-
ment is a dynamic and complex process 
presents new challenges for communicating 
the science to the public. Oversimplification 
in science communication remains ram-
pant.  It is easy to find proposals in popular 
science writing that oversimplify the rela-
tionship between genes and mind.  However, 
this may also be steadily changing as the 
term epigenetics enters the mainstream. 
Several prominent books recently convey the 
“elegant complexity,” so to speak, of the evo-
lutionary-developmental process (a few of 
our favorites: Anderson, 2014; Carroll, 2005; 
Jablonka & Lamb, 2014; Mitchell, 2009). Such 
efforts will slowly turn the tables on those 
who oversimplify.  A provocative prediction 
is that this shifting appreciation by the pub-
lic—that behavior and form emerge from a 
fascinating tapestry of gene-environment 
interactions—may disincentivize scientists 
selling simplistic causal chains.
Getting the right understanding of how 
genes and environment interact has criti-
cal implications in medical and educational 
practices, public policy, and more.  The public 
audience and the practitioners they depend 
on would benefit greatly from recognizing 
that when a given genetic disorder affects 
the brain, it affects the development of the 
entire brain (Karmiloff-Smith, Brown, Grice, 
Paterson, 2003).  As a result, most cognitive 
disorders are not as domain-specific as they 
superficially appear (Gilger, 2008).  And the 
interaction between a genetic predisposition 
and the environment can produce a feedback 
loop that has consequences for cognitive 
development.  For example, toddlers diag-
nosed as on the autism spectrum produce 
fewer speech-like utterances, which naturally 
elicits fewer speech-based interactions from 
caregivers.  With a less robust feedback loop 
of speech stimuli between child and caregiver, 
the environment could disadvantage that child 
for language learning (Warlaumont, Richards, 
Gilkerson, Oller, 2014; see also Leezenbaum 
et al., 2013; Yoder & Warren, 1999). It is pos-
sible that symptoms emergent after the first 
year of life have roots in subtle differences in 
prenatal brain development coupled dynam-
ically with effects these differences have on 
the individual’s social and other experiences. 
Such observations would greatly impact how 
intervention approaches are developed and 
assessed.
We think a synthesis is on the horizon, both 
scientifically and in the broader public under-
standing of these matters. And this synthesis 
matters—a lot. Armed with the knowledge 
that cognitive development is a complex 
process of genes, epigenetics, brain devel-
opment, neural computation, and interaction 
with the environment, cognitive scientists will 
advance theory beyond “nature vs. nurture.” 
To the public, this represents a complex and 
fascinating worldview that guides innovation 
in healthcare and education.
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What a thoughtful and invigorating set of 
responses to our dialogue invitation. We read 
them with relish and thank all the authors for 
contributing. In our brief comment space, we 
will focus on three general themes: the utility 
of the nature/nurture debate viewed through 
the lens of different disciplines, how the topics 
of language and language development seem 
to be particularly tricky territory, and the need 
for a fresh vocabulary.
 
It was striking to see how many comments 
reflect the perspectives that come with 
producing science in different domains: 
developmental biology vs. developmental 
behavioral neuroscience vs. cognitive devel-
opment vs. cognitive science. On the whole, 
biologists appear to see nature/nurture as 
settled, and wonder why the phrase is so resil-
ient. In contrast, cognitive scientists still see 
some value in the nature/nurture dichotomy.
This contrast is particularly notable in the 
area of language development. The study of 
language has created a stark divide across 
disciplinary domains. Whereas biologists tend 
to focus on topics that connect humans with 
other species, language researchers tend to 
focus on what sets us apart. This makes it dif-
ficult for biologists and cognitive scientists to 
find common ground. 
Consider, for instance, the fundamental ques-
tion that feeds the nature/nurture debate in 
the area of language development and lin-
guistics: Can language be learned, or is there 
a need for psychological primitives—some 
innate language module or other represen-
tational building blocks that make language 
possible? We suggest that this centuries-old 
question may itself be misleading. 
“Can language be learned” suggests a stark 
line of separation between things that are 
learned and things that are not learned. But 
our current understanding of the mecha-
nisms that underlie learning and memory 
now extends far beyond classic concepts, and 
suggests that experience—a concept much 
broader than learning—plays a prominent role 
in all developmental processes. Experience 
lies at the heart of the concept of epigenesis 
and its modern meaning within the develop-
mental systems perspective. Genes and cells 
have experiences, too, and those experiences 
shape their development and function. Thus, 
at no level of analysis are the mechanisms of 
development dissociated from experience. 
Put differently, although many developmen-
tal outcomes emerge without learning, they 
nonetheless depend upon experience. 
This lesson comes to the fore in neural net-
work approaches to language development: 
One might be tempted to say that the con-
tent these systems learn is the nurture bit, 
whereas the initial state of the network—the 
initial global architecture, for example—is 
the nature bit. By extension, this means that 
having a brain with a particular architec-
ture indicates a nativist starting point for 
language. But when we ask developmental 
biologists how brains are built in develop-
ment, we discover that the brain emerges 
step-by-step from a host of complex interac-
tions—or experiences—that unfold within a 
local environment to create a developmental 
cascade. The human brain, it seems, is not at 
all the direct product of our genes; it is not 
hard-wired; rather, it is a reliable product of 
the developmental process. Thus, we are left 
with interactions all the way down. There is 
simply no clean divide between the architecture 
of the brain and the content that fills it. 
This leads us back to the central question: 
Why does the nature/nurture framing persist? 
From this dialogue, we discern two answers: 
First, there is a lack of clarity in the concepts 
we use, and a failure to recognize that the 
concepts themselves can change meaning as 
science develops. Learning vs. experience is 
a case in point. Second, when faced with the 
complexity of development on the one hand 
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and the complexity of learning language on 
the other, our faith in the power of genes—
in nature—encourages us to stop looking for 
developmental answers. When this happens, 
we often fall back on historical concepts and 
arguments that might not make sense in the 
context of modern scientific understanding. 
Calling the architecture of the brain “innate” 
is a case in point. In this context, subtle dif-
ferences in how we use words in our different 
fields can have profound consequences.
Critically, accepting the status quo is not a 
viable option. As scientists—and as citizens—
it is imperative that we continually revisit 
these debates because they literally shape 
the world around us. Several of the authors 
noted this, highlighting the impact of the 
nature/nurture framing on how we approach, 
for instance, atypical development. In short, 
parents, practitioners, and policy makers are 
counting on us to get it right, to clarify how 
children develop.
This is the reason we created the WIREs spe-
cial collection “How We Develop” (it will be 
available at http://wires.wiley.com/go/how-
wedevelop in a few weeks)—to challenge our 
field to up its game; to revisit old ideas from 
a fresh, integrative perspective. Toward that 
end, we commissioned a set of essays that 
present a developmental systems perspec-
tive from genes and brains to behavioral and 
cognitive development, creating a coherent 
whole that spans biology and psychology and 
bridges the animal-to-human divide. 
We also encouraged the authors to make their 
essays as accessible as possible so that these 
ideas could reach a broad audience. Our larger 
goal was to create a ‘go to’ site for develop-
mental systems thinking. We hope you will all 
join in the conversation once the collection is 
published this fall. Perhaps together we can 
move beyond a dichotomy that has distorted 
so much of our thinking and articulate a new 
and more satisfying vision of how we develop.
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Computational modelling is the process by 
which phenomena found in complex systems 
are expressed algorithmically. The creation of 
such simulations is useful because it allows us 
to test whether our understanding is sophis-
ticated enough to create credible working 
models of the phenomena we are studying. In 
neuroscience and cognitive science especially, 
computational modelling comprises more 
than just capturing a single phenomenon, it 
also implements a theory. It gives scientists a 
method of allowing their ideas to be executed, 
i.e., for emergent properties to appear when 
they are implemented and run (McClelland, 
2009). In this context, a model is said to be 
replicable if experiments within it can be 
carried out successfully using the original 
codebase, with the implicit assumption that 
such a codebase is available.
However, for models to be evaluated it is 
mandatory to ensure they are reproducible 
(Topalidou, Leblois, Boraud, & Rougier, 2015). 
That is, that they can be recreated based 
on their specification — the details deemed 
important enough to be included in the 
accompanying article (Hinsen, 2015). Ideally, 
this should be possible without contacting 
the authors for advice, and critically, without 
referring to the original code (Cooper & Guest, 
2014). If the specification is sufficient to suc-
cessfully recreate the codebase from scratch, 
then the model is said to be reproducible. This 
adds further credence to both the model and 
its overarching theoretical framework. If not, 
and the model cannot be recreated, then even 
if the experiments can be carried out success-
fully within the original codebase, the model 
is not reproducible (Crook, Davison, & Plesser, 
2013).
How to share computational research?
Access to the original codebase is not 
always straightforward. There have been 
few substantial changes within scholarly 
communication and research dissemination 
since 1665, when the first academic journals 
(Le Journal des Sçavans and Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society) were pub-
lished. Dissemination of scientific discoveries 
via publishers continues to consist primar-
ily of static text and figures. However, most 
research is underpinned by, if not wholly com-
prised of, code, which is inherently dynamic.
Given code forms the backbone of modern 
scientific research, it is perhaps unusual 
that its position within this framework is 
not clear. For example, it is not straightfor-
ward where codebases should be placed: in 
a footnote (with code assured to be available 
upon request), in supplementary materials, 
or in an online repository? Even though more 
journals are requesting code, as well as raw 
data, few publisherbacked repositories exist. 
It is striking that an overwhelming number of 
journals make no provisions for and offer lit-
tle guidance on hosting these files or indeed 
facilitating access to them.
Is it time for progress?
The open source and open science com-
munities proposed solutions to some of the 
aforementioned problems without publish-
ers’ aid nor mediation. Firstly, a set of new 
innovative software tools (e.g., the binder 
project) make modelling work more accessi-
ble. Secondly, some researchers have taken 
matters into their own hands and created 
resources for best practice (e.g., version 
control: Blischak, Davenport, & Wilson, 2016; 
Eglen et al., 2016; Wilson, 2016). While others 
lead by example: Ogrean et al. (2016) pub-
lished an article with an interactive figure; 
and the LIGO Open Science Center released 
extensive amounts of data and code (LIGO 
Open Science Center: Tutorials, 2016). In the 
same vein, the ReScience journal encourages 
the reproduction of modelling work.
Is the scientific community ready to embrace 
and facilitate changes with respect to: asso-
ciating articles with original codebases in a 
transparent way and, more broadly, making 
sure computational theories are well-speci-
fied and coherently implemented?
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Editorial IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems
Yaochu Jin
Lingodroids: Cross-Situational Learning for Episodic Elements
Scott Heath, David Ball, Janet Wiles
For robots to effectively bootstrap the acquisition of language, they must handle referential uncer-
tainty-the problem of deciding what meaning to ascribe to a given word. Typically when socially 
grounding terms for space and time, the underlying sensor or representation was specified within 
the grammar of a conversation, which constrained language learning to words for innate features. 
In this paper, we demonstrate that cross-situational learning resolves the issues of referential 
uncertainty for bootstrapping a language for episodic space and time; therefore removing the 
need to specify the underlying sensors or representations a priori. The requirements for robots 
to be able to link words to their designated meanings are presented and analyzed within the 
Lingodroids-language learning robots-framework. We present a study that compares predeter-
mined associations given a priori against unconstrained learning using cross-situational learning. 
This study investigates the long-term coherence, immediate usability and learning time for each 
condition. Results demonstrate that for unconstrained learning, the long-term coherence is unaf-
fected, though at the cost of increased learning time and hence decreased immediate usability.
A Sensorimotor Learning Framework for Object Categorization
Virgile Högman, Mårten Björkman, Atsuto Maki, Danica Kragic
This paper presents a framework that enables a robot to discover various object categories 
through interaction. The categories are described using action-effect relations, i.e., sensorimo-
tor contingencies rather than more static shape or appearance representation. The framework 
provides a functionality to classify objects and the resulting categories, associating a class with 
a specific module. We demonstrate the performance of the framework by studying a pushing 
behavior in robots, encoding the sensorimotor contingencies and their predictability with Gaussian 
Processes. We show how entropy-based action selection can improve object classification and 
how functional categories emerge from the similarities of effects observed among the objects. 
We also show how a multidimensional action space can be realized by parameterizing pushing 
using both position and velocity.
Active Learning of Object and Body Models with Time Constraints on a Humanoid 
Robot
Arturo Ribes, Jesus Cerquides, Yiannis Demiris, Ramon Lopez de Mantaras
In this paper, we propose an active learning approach applied to a music performance imitation 
scenario. The humanoid robot iCub listens to a human performance and then incrementally learns 
to use a virtual musical instrument in order to imitate the given sequence. This is achieved by 
first learning a model of the instrument, needed to locate where the required sounds are heard 
in a virtual keyboard layed out in a tactile interface. Then, a model of its body capabilities is also 
learnt, which serves to establish the likelihood of success of the actions needed to imitate the 
sequence of sounds and to correct the errors made by the underlying kinematic controller. It also 
uses self-evaluation stages to provide feedback to the human instructor, which can be used to 
guide its learning process.
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Learning Context on a Humanoid Robot using Incremental Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Hande Çelikkanat, Güner Orhan, Nicolas Pugeault, Frank Guerin, Erol Şahin, Sinan 
Kalkan
In this paper, we formalize and model context in terms of a set of concepts grounded in the 
sensorimotor interactions of a robot. The concepts are modeled as a web using Markov Random 
Field (MRF), inspired from the concept web hypothesis for representing concepts in humans. On 
this concept web, we treat context as a latent variable of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), which 
is a widely-used method in computational linguistics for modeling topics in texts. We extend the 
standard LDA method in order to make it incremental so that: 1) it does not relearn everything 
from scratch given new interactions (i.e., it is online); and 2) it can discover and add a new context 
into its model when necessary. We demonstrate on the iCub platform that, partly owing to model-
ing context on top of the concept web, our approach is adaptive, online, and robust: it is adaptive 
and online since it can learn and discover a new context from new interactions. It is robust since 
it is not affected by irrelevant stimuli and it can discover contexts after a few interactions only. 
Moreover, we show how to use the context learned in such a model for two important tasks: object 
recognition and planning.
Learning Visuomotor Transformations and End Effector Appearance by Local Visual 
Consistency
Tao Zhou, Bertram E. Shi
We present an algorithm that enables a robot to learn the visuomotor transformation from its 
joint angle space to visual space. The learned transformation can accurately predict location and 
shape of robot end effector’s image projection. This paper extends past work by approximating the 
end effector by a planar region, rather than a point, in 3-D space, and through its use of spatially 
and temporally local, rather than global, measures of image consistency. Our robotic experiments 
demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can learn location and shape of the image region cor-
responding to the end effector, and how it deforms as the arm moves randomly in front of the 
camera. Our approach does not require that the end effector be identified with a specific marker. 
We also demonstrate that the region corresponding to the end effector can adapt to changes in 
the end effector shape.
Volume 8, Issue 2, June 2016
Verification of the Effect of an Assembly Skill Transfer Method on Cognition Skills
Feng Duan, Zhao Zhang, Qi Gao, Tamio Arai
This paper aims to investigate an effective assembly skill transfer method to improve the novice 
operator’s assembly performance. Training novice operators with all of the skilled operators’ 
assembly skills in a short time has so far proven unsuccessful. Therefore, to accelerate the training 
period, we attempted to extract and transfer the assembly skills on which the skilled operators 
and the novice operators place different emphases. Since the assembly tasks in the cellular man-
ufacturing system primarily comprise cognitive tasks, the assembly performance depends on the 
operators’ cognition skills. We applied the developed skill transfer method via a “peg-insertion 
task” to verify its effect on cognition skills. The results indicate that the proposed assembly skill 
transfer system can considerably improve novice operators’ assembly performance.
Bootstrapping the Semantics of Tools: Affordance Analysis of Real World Objects on 
a Per-part Basis
Markus Schoeler, Florentin Wörgötter
This study shows how understanding of object functionality arises by analyzing objects at the 
level of their parts where we focus here on primary tools. First, we create a set of primary tool 
functionalities, which we speculate is related to the possible functions of the human hand. The 
function of a tool is found by comparing it to this set. For this, the unknown tool is segmented, 
using a data-driven method, into its parts and evaluated using the geometrical part constellations 
against the training set. We demonstrate that various tools and even uncommon tool-versions can 
IEEE TAMD Table of Contents
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be recognized. The system “understands” that objects can be used as makeshift replacements. 
For example, a helmet or a hollow skull can be used to transport water. Our system supersedes 
state-of-the-art recognition algorithms in recognition and generalization performance. To support 
the conjecture of a possible cognitive hand-to-tool transfer we analyze, at the end of this study, 
primary tools by also incorporating tool-dynamics. We create an ontology of tool functions where 
we find only 32 of them. Being such a small set this would indeed allow bootstrapping tool-under-
standing by exploration-based learning of hand function and hand-to-tool transfer.
Towards Deep Developmental Learning
Olivier Sigaud, Alain Droniou
Deep learning techniques are having an undeniable impact on general pattern recognition issues. 
In this paper, from a developmental robotics perspective, we scrutinize deep learning techniques 
under the light of their capability to construct a hierarchy of meaningful multimodal represen-
tations from the raw sensors of robots. These investigations reveal the differences between the 
methodological constraints of pattern recognition and those of developmental robotics. In partic-
ular, we outline the necessity to rely on unsupervised rather than supervised learning methods 
and we highlight the need for progress towards the implementation of hierarchical predictive 
processing capabilities. Based on these new tools, we outline the emergence of a new domain that 
we call deep developmental learning.
Understanding Human Behaviors with an Object Functional Role Perspective for 
Robotics
Rui Liu, Xiaoli Zhang
Intelligent robotic assistance requires a robot to accurately understand human behavior. Many 
researchers have explored human-object interactions to decode behavior-related information. 
However, current methods only model probabilistic correlations between objects and activities. 
Their applications are usually limited to fixed environments and fixed sets of activities. They are 
unable to deal with variability in the real environments due to the lack of the human-like cogni-
tive reasoning process. To address this urgent problem, we developed an Object Functional Role 
Perspective method to endow a robot with comprehensive behavior understanding. Instead of 
using specific objects to identify an activity, our role-based method models the human cognitive 
process during task performing by analyzing object selection and object interaction. Then activ-
ity-related information, such as activity feasibility, likely plan, and urgent need of an activity, is 
inferred in order to improve a robot’s cognition level for comprehensive behavior understanding. 
Through a large amount of human behavior observations, this cognitive knowledge is constructed 
using a Markov random field (MRF) model. Experiments were performed in both real-life scenarios 
and lab scenarios to evaluate the method’s usefulness. The results demonstrated flexibility and 
effectiveness of the role-based method for human behavior understanding under variability.
Modeling Early Vocal Development Through Infant–Caregiver Interaction: A Review
Minoru Asada
The developmental origin of language communication seems to involve vocal interactions between 
an infant and a caregiver, and one of the big mysteries related to this is how an infant learns to 
vocalize the caregiver’s native language. Many theories attempt to explain this ability of infant 
as imitation based on acoustic matching. However, the acoustic qualities of speech produced by 
the infant and caregiver are quite different and therefore cannot be fully explained by imitation. 
Instead, the interaction itself may have an important role to play, but the mechanism is still unclear. 
In this paper, we review studies addressing this topic based on explicit interaction mechanisms 
using computer simulations and/or real vocal robots. The relationships between these approaches 
are analyzed after a brief review of the early development of an infant’s speech perception and 
articulation based on observational studies in developmental psychology and a few neuroscientific 
imaging studies. Finally, future issues related to real infant-caregiver vocal interaction are outlined.
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